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Dear Ms. D'Alesandro:
The State directs the Court's attention to State v.
Carter, No. 970038-CA (July 16, 1998) (attached) , which is the
companion case to Ellis, and in which the same issue raised
herein was decided in favor of the defendant. Since this case is
scheduled for oral argument this coming Monday, October 26, 1998,
the State respectfully requests that this letter and the attached
case be distributed to the panel forthwith.
This supplemental authority is submitted pursuant to
rule 24(h), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Respectfully,

Kenneth A. Bronston
Assistant Attorney General
cc: Catherine L. Begic
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State of Utah,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellee,
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Case No. 970038-CA

Tommy Glen Carter,
Defendant and Appellant.

F I L E D
( J u l y 1 6 , 1998)

Third District, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup
Attorneys:

Wayne A. Freestone, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Jan Graham and Joanne C. Slotnik, Salt Lake City, for
Appellee

Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Jackson.
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion
in failing to grant defendant's motion for a continuance. We
agree and reverse.
"The decision to grant or deny a continuance lies within the
sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on
appeal absent a clear abuse of that discretion." State v.
HprtQH, 848 P.2d 708, 714 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); see aiSP State V,
CabUtUtan, 861 P.2d 408, 413 (Utah 1993).
"When moving for a continuance, the moving party must show
that the denial of the motion will prevent the party from
obtaining material and admissible evidence, that any additional
witnesses it seeks can be produced within a reasonable time, and
that it has exercised due diligence in preparing for the case
before requesting the continuance." Horton. 84 8 P.2d at 714; £££
SLLSQ State v. Creviston. 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982). However,
in determining whether the party has meet this burden, a court
must consider the exigent circumstances, if any, under which the
motion is made. Cf. Cabututan. 861 P.2d at 414 (reversing trial
court's denial of motion for new trial on ground of newly
discovered evidence because reason why defendant "could only

generally refer" to the newly discovered testimony and could not
yet establish the exact nature of that testimony at time motion
heard was outside defendant's control); Salazar v. State. 559
P.2d 66, 72 (Alaska 1976) (stating whether denial of motion for
continuance is abuse of discretion "'depends upon the
circumstances of each case, especially the reasons supporting the
request for continuance.1" (citation omitted)).
In this case, defense counsel learned of a possible new
witness on the morning of the second day of trial.1 Counsel
informed the court of this development and the court directed
counsel to speak with that new witness, apparently to ascertain
the materiality of the witness and whether further investigation
was warranted. Upon his return to court, counsel promptly
requested a continuance, arguing that this new witness--a prison
inmate who, only that morning, indicated he knew the victim--was
material to the defense to establish that the victim both used
and purchased drugs, evidence that would be useful both to
impeach the victim's testimony and to support defendant's
assertion that the victim had given defendant the money in the
course of a drug transaction.2 Because of the timing of the new
witness's disclosure and counsel's obvious need to address the
court immediately, counsel's understanding of the witness's
usefulness and his argument to the court were necessarily
preliminary. Nonetheless, counsel's description of the witness's
knowledge clearly indicated that further investigation was
warranted. Under the exigent circumstances of this case, then,
we believe the information provided the court was sufficient to
support a continuance. Furthermore, because the evidence
disclosed went not only to impeachment of the victim's testimony
but also to defendant's primary defense, we believe defendant was
prejudiced by the trial court's denial. See State v. Oliver, 820
P.2d 474, 476 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (holding "that on appeal, the
1. Defendant was tried at the same time as a co-defendant and
each had separate counsel. Because we believe the counsel were
joined in their interest in the newly discovered witness, we
attribute any actions of co-defendant's counsel to defendant's
counsel and do not distinguish between the two.
2. Because the newly discovered evidence did not go solely to
the victim's credibility but went also to support defendant's
claim that the victim had given defendant the money in the course
of a drug deal, this evidence is distinguishable from that
discussed in State v. Martinez. 848 P.2d 702, 704-05 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993) (holding extrinsic evidence of witness's prior acts of
drug use inadmissible under Rule 608(b) of the Utah Rules of
Evidence because evidence was "irrelevant" except for impeachment
purposes.).
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moving party must show that it was materially prejudiced by the
court's denial of the continuance"). We thus conclude that the
trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion.
We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

I CONCUR:

Judith M. Billings, Judge*^

JACKSON, Judge (dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. I believe that the defendant's
argument that the trial court's denial of his motion for a
continuance was an abuse of discretion fails the three-prong
continuance test under State v. Horton. 848 P.2d 708, 714 (Utah
Ct. App. 1993). Consequently, I would affirm.
First, according to the transcript of the hearing on the
motion, defendant's proposed witness, Meek, would have testified
that he had seen the victim, Irvin, use crystal methamphetamine
within the two years before trial. At the hearing, defendant
offered this proposed testimony solely to impeach Irvin because
"Mr. Irvin indicated that he doesn't use drugs in his testimony."
However, I believe Meek's testimony about crystal methamphetamine
was irrelevant for purposes of impeaching Irvin's testimony and,
thus, was immaterial and inadmissible.
During trial, the following colloquy between codefendant's
counsel and the victim, Irvin, occurred:
Q.
So you do have a usual practice
about purchasing marijuana?
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A.

No, ma'am.

Q.

Do you use marijuana?

3

A.

No, ma•am.

Q.
Have you ever had anything in your
possession that is used to use marijuana?
A.

Yes, I have before.

Because the only drug Irvin denied currently buying and using was
marijuana, evidence of crystal methamphetamine usage was
irrelevant to impeach Irvin. After all, he had not testified
that he did not buy or use any drugs whatsoever. Evidence that
he had used crystal methamphetamine would not have put in
question his testimony about marijuana use. Perhaps if Irvin had
instead been asked about more general drug use in the past and
had testified that he had not used drugs in the past Meek's
testimony would have been relevant to impeach Irvin.
Meek also would have testified that he had a friend to whom
Irvin owed money for drugs. This would have been inadmissible
hearsay evidence. See Utah R. Evid. 801. Thus, as to Meek's
testimony, defendant fails the first prong of the continuance
test--"[w]hen moving for a continuance, the moving party must
show that denial of the motion will prevent the party from
obtaining material and admissible evidence." Horton, 848 P.2d at
714.
Second, defendant argues that if the continuance had been
granted, he would have tried to find Meek's friend to whom Irvin
allegedly owed money for drugs. According to the hearing
transcript, this friend's testimony also would have been offered
solely to impeach Irvin's testimony that Irvin does not "have a
usual practice about purchasing marijuana." I note initially
that Irvin's statement about not having a usual practice of
buying marijuana was in the present tense and, therefore,
testimony about him buying drugs in the past would not render his
testimony false, placing his credibility at issue. Further, as
to Meek's elusive friend, about whom no identifying information
such as name or location was offered to the court, defendant did
not meet the second prong of the continuance test--showing that
any additional witnesses can be produced in a reasonable time.
£££ UQZLQn, 848 P.2d at 714.
Finally, the cross-examination colloquy quoted above
elicited Irvin's testimony that he had possessed marijuana
paraphernalia in the past. The jury therefore already had
evidence of Irvinfs potential drug usage before it. The jury
could have inferred from Irvin's testimony that he had used
marijuana before and might have been in the market for it on the
day of the crime, just as defendant testified. Even so, the jury
obviously believed Irvin's story over defendant's. Thus, the
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error, if any, in essentially denying defendant the opportunity
to present further testimony was harmless. See Utah R. Crim. P.
30.
Accordingly, I dissent and would affirm the trial court's
exercise of discretion.

Norman H. Jackson^Judge
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Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Jackson.
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion
in failing to grant defendant's motion for a continuance. We
agree and reverse.
"The decision to grant or deny a continuance lies within the
sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on
appeal absent a clear abuse of that discretion.11 State v.
Horton, 848 P.2d 708, 714 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); see also State v.
CabutUtan, 861 P.2d 408, 413 (Utah 1993).
"When moving for a continuance, the moving party must show
that the denial of the motion will prevent the party from
obtaining material and admissible evidence, that any additional
witnesses it seeks can be produced within a reasonable time, and
that it has exercised due diligence in preparing for the case
before requesting the continuance." Horton. 84 8 P.2d at 714; see
also. State v. Creviston. 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982). However,
in determining whether the party has meet this burden, a court
must consider the exigent circumstances, if any, under which the
motion is made. Cf. Cabututan. 861 P.2d at 414 (reversing trial
court's denial of motion for new trial on ground of newly
discovered evidence because reason why defendant "could only

generally refer" to the newly discovered testimony and could not
yet establish the exact nature of that testimony at time motion
heard was outside defendant's control); Salazar v. State. 559
P.2d 66, 72 (Alaska 1976) (stating whether denial of motion for
continuance is abuse of discretion "'depends upon the
circumstances of each case, especially the reasons supporting the
request for continuance.'" (citation omitted)).
In this case, defense counsel learned of a possible new
witness on the morning of the second day of trial.1 Counsel
informed the court of this development and the court directed
counsel to speak with that new witness, apparently to ascertain
the materiality of the witness and whether further investigation
was warranted. Upon his return to court, counsel promptly
requested a continuance, arguing that this new witness--a prison
inmate who, only that morning, indicated he knew the victim--was
material to the defense to establish that the victim both used
and purchased drugs, evidence that would be useful both to
impeach the victim's testimony and to support defendant's
assertion that the victim had given defendant the money in the
course of a drug transaction.2 Because of the timing of the new
witness's disclosure and counsel's obvious need to address the
court immediately, counsel's understanding of the witness's
usefulness and his argument to the court were necessarily
preliminary. Nonetheless, counsel's description of the witness's
knowledge clearly indicated that further investigation was
warranted. Under the exigent circumstances of this case, then,
we believe the information provided the court was sufficient to
support a continuance. Furthermore, because the evidence
disclosed went not only to impeachment of the victim's testimony
but also to defendant's primary defense, we believe defendant was
prejudiced by the trial court's denial. &££ State v. Oliver, 820
P.2d 474, 476 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (holding "that on appeal, the
1. Defendant was tried at the same time as a co-defendant and
each had separate counsel. Because we believe the counsel were
joined in their interest in the newly discovered witness, we
attribute any actions of co-defendant's counsel to defendant's
counsel and do not distinguish between the two.
2. Because the newly discovered evidence did not go solely to
the victim's credibility but went also to support defendant's
claim that the victim had given defendant the money in the course
of a drug deal, this evidence is distinguishable from that
discussed in State v., Martinez. 848 P.2d 702, 704-05 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993) (holding €»xtrinsic evidence of witness's prior acts of
drug use inadmissible under Rule 608(b) of the Utah Rules of
Evidence because evidence was "irrelevant" except for impeachment
purposes.).
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moving party must show that it was materially prejudiced by the
court's denial of the continuance"). We thus conclude that the
trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion.
We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

I CONCUR:

3U&tifiJ

•Judith M. Billing^,

JACKSON, Judge (dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. I believe that the defendant's
argument that the trial court's denial of his motion for a
continuance was an abuse of discretion fails the three-prong
continuance test under State v. Horton. 848 P.2d 708, 714 (Utah
Ct. App. 1993). Consequently, I would affirm.
First, according to the transcript of the hearing on the
motion, defendant's proposed witness, Meek, would have testified
that he had seen the victim, Irvin, use crystal methamphetamine
within the two years before trial. At the hearing, defendant
offered this proposed testimony solely to impeach Irvin because
"Mr. Irvin indicated that he doesn't use drugs in his testimony."
However, I believe Meek's testimony about crystal methamphetamine
was irrelevant for purposes of impeaching Irvin's testimony and,
thus, was immaterial and inadmissible.
During trial, the following colloquy between codefendant•s
counsel and the victim, Irvin, occurred:
Q.
So you do have a usual practice
about purchasing marijuana?
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A.

No, ma'am.

Q.

Do you use marijuana?

3

A.

No, ma'am.

Q.
Have you ever had anything in your
possession that is used to use marijuana?
A.

Yes, I have before.

Because the only drug Irvin denied currently buying and using was
marijuana, evidence of crystal methamphetamine usage was
irrelevant to impeach Irvin. After all, he had not testified
that he did not buy or use any drugs whatsoever. Evidence that
he had used crystal methamphetamine would not have put in
question his testimony about marijuana use. Perhaps if Irvin had
instead been asked about more general drug use in the past and
had testified that he had not used drugs in the past Meek's
testimony would have been relevant to impeach Irvin.
Meek also would have testified that he had a friend to whom
Irvin owed money for drugs. This would have been inadmissible
hearsay evidence. See Utah R. Evid. 801. Thus, as to Meek's
testimony, defendant fails the first prong of the continuance
test—"[w]hen moving for a continuance, the moving party must
show that denial of the motion will prevent the party from
obtaining material and admissible evidence." Horton, 848 P.2d at
714.
Second, defendant argues that if the continuance had been
granted, he would have tried to find Meek's friend to whom Irvin
allegedly owed money for drugs. According to the hearing
transcript, this friend's testimony also would have been offered
solely to impeach Irvin's testimony that Irvin does not "have a
usual practice about purchasing marijuana." I note initially
that Irvin's statement about not having a usual practice of
buying marijuana was in the present tense and, therefore,
testimony about him buying drugs in the past would not render his
testimony false, placing his credibility at issue. Further, as
to Meek's elusive friend, about whom no identifying information
such as name or location was offered to the court, defendant did
not meet the second prong of the continuance test--showing that
any additional witnesses can be produced in a reasonable time.
£££ H£TL£I1, 848 P.2d at 714.
Finally, the cross-examination colloquy quoted above
elicited Irvin's testimony that he had possessed marijuana
paraphernalia in the past. The jury therefore already had
evidence of Irvinfs potential drug usage before it. The jury
could have inferred from Irvin!s testimony that he had used
marijuana before and might have been in the market for it on the
day of the crime, just as defendant testified. Even so, the jury
obviously believed Irvin's story over defendant's. Thus, the
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error, if any, in essentially denying defendant the opportunity
to present further testimony was harmless. See Utah R. Crim. P.
30.
Accordingly, I dissent and would affirm the trial court's
exercise of discretion.

Nortfan H. Jackson^Judge
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

Case No. 970294-CA

:

Priority No. 2

v.
KENNETH B. ELLIS,
Defendant/Appellant.

:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for theft from a person, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-404, -412 (Supp. 1997), in the Third
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Kenneth
Rigtrup, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1. Did defendant preserve for appeal his claim that the trial court improperly
denied his motion for a continuance based primarily on the materiality of a newly
discovered witnesses' testimony where defendant argued in the trial court only that he
sought the witnesses' testimony for impeachment purposes? A reviewing court will

decline to review an issue not preserved in the trial court in the absence of plain error.
State v. Rangel. 866 P.2d 607, 611-12 (Utah App. 1993). In the event this Court chooses
to review the merits of the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for a continuance, the
standard of review is abuse of discretion. "The grant or denial of a continuance is within
the discretion of the trial court." State v. Oliver. 820 P.2d 474, 476 (Utah App. 1991),
cert, denied. 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992) (citations omitted). "[The reviewing court] court
will not reverse the trial court's decision absent a clear abuse of discretion." Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
Statutes relevant to this appeal are:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995). Theft - Elements.
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (Supp. 1997). Theft - Classification of offenses.
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter shall be
punishable:
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the:
(i) value of the property or services is or exceeds $5,000;
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle;
(iii) actor is armed with a dangerous weapon, as defined in Section
76-1-601, at the time of the theft; or
(iv) property is stolen from the person of another[.]
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Kenneth B. Ellis, was charged with theft from a person (R. 4-5). He
and his codefendant, Tommy Carter, were tried together (R. 14). Defendant was
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convicted of the charged offense following a jury trial (R. 69). He was sentenced to a
statutory one-to-fifteen year term in the Utah State Prison (R. 79-80). The sentence was
initially stayed, but when defendant absconded from the court-ordered Odyssey House
drug rehabilitation program on the day he arrived, probation was revoked and defendant
was committed to the prison (R. 79-80; 101-02, 105, 119-21, 138: 10-11).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On June 27, 1996, at about 5:00 p.m., Joshua Irvin was returning from work on a
bus which left him near the intersection of North Temple and Main Street in downtown
Salt Lake City (R. 134: 1-3, 44-45). Planning to get a soda, he removed money from his
pocket, sorted the change from the bills, and put the bills, a $10 bill and a couple of $1
bills, back in his pocket (R. 134: 3-4). As Irvin continued walking towards the Circle K
convenience store, located at 50 North and 200 West, he was brought to a halt by
defendant, who bumped into him from behind and immediately stepped in front of him
(R. 134: 1-2, 4-7, 23-24, 44). Then Irvin felt a tug on his pants and felt codefendant
Tommy Carter emptying his (Irvin's) pants pocket, resulting in the theft of the $10 bill
and a few $1 bills (R. 134: 6-7, 20-22, 38-39, 43). Irvin yelled that he needed the money,
but both defendant and Carter just smiled and trotted away (R. 134: 9).
Somewhat in shock and afraid, Irvin did not pursue defendant and Carter, but
fruitlessly looked around to see if the incident had been witnessed (R. 134: 8-10).
However, after feeling the sting of being victimized, he called 911 for assistance from the
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Travelodge inn on North Temple and gave the dispatcher a description of the two thieves
(R. 134: 10-11). Getting anxious after waiting five minutes, Irvin looked for the thieves
and spied them sitting on the grass outside the Greyhound Bus Terminal on North Temple
(R. 134: 12-13, 55). Irvin immediately called 911 again, and within a couple of minutes
Salt Lake City Police Officers Melody Gray and Todd Mitchell arrived on bicycles (R.
134: 13, 53-54). The officers found Irvin in an excited state (R. 134: 92). Irvin gave the
officers a description, pointed in the direction of the two thieves, and followed after the
officers (R. 134: 13-14). The officers detained defendant and Carter, and Irvin positively
identified them as the men who had stopped him and taken his money (R. 134: 14, 71).
Irvin denied using drugs or marijuana, although he acknowledged having
paraphernalia for using marijuana in his possession in 1990 (R. 134: 24-26). He also
denied approaching Carter to buy any drugs or marijuana (R. 134: 18).
Officers Gray and Mitchell responded to the dispatch call (R. 134: 53-54). They
found defendant and Carter, who matched the descriptions given to them by dispatch,
sitting on a retaining wall near the Greyhound Bus Terminal (R. 134: 55). Although
defendant and Carter did not try to run, Officer Gray thought they looked surprised, not
having immediately recognized she and Officer Mitchell as police officers (R. 134: 63).
Officer Gray informed defendant that he was a robbery suspect, although she did not
inform him about what had been taken (R. 134: 57-58). Defendant, however,
immediately and repeatedly stated that he had not taken the money (R. 134: 57).
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Officer Mitchell mirandized both defendant and Carter, and then separated the two
defendants (R. 134: 67-68). Defendant told Officer Mitchell that he saw Irvin, whom he
did not know and had never touched or bumped, give Carter some money as they stood at
the comer of 100 South and Main Street (R. 134: 68). Defendant then claimed that he
and Carter went to a Circle K and bought some beer with the money (R. 134: 69). Carter
told Mitchell, while gesturing at Irvin, that the incident had not happened as his accuser
charged (R. 134: 70). Mitchell searched Carter, found a $10 bill, and arrested defendant
and Carter (R. 134:72-73).
Maggie Orton, clerk at the Circle K, located at 210 West North Temple Street,
confirmed that two homeless looking individuals purchased two quarts of beer at about
5:00 p.m., although she could not positively confirm at trial that they were defendant and
Carter (R. 135: 111-15).
Carter testified that on the afternoon of the incident he was killing time, about one
and one half hours, in front of the Nordstrom's entrance to the Crossroads Mall, near the
comer of 1st South and Main Street, waiting for his boss to get home in order to approach
him for an advancement on his pay check (R. 135: 139, 151-52). There he
serendipitously met defendant, an old friend whom he had not lately seen, and suggested
they go somewhere for a beer (R. 135: 139-40). Carter then saw Irvin, who appeared to
be looking around as though he were in the market to buy something (R. 135: 140).
Carter asked Irvin if he was looking for anything, to which Irvin allegedly replied, "Well,
5

maybe a little bit of weed, marijuana" (R. 135: 141). The two men then went around a
comer and completed the deal, with Irvin allegedly handing Carter $13 (R. 135: 141-43).
From there Carter and Irvin walked past the bus station, near Second West and North
Temple, to get drugs from a friend of Carter's while defendant trailed silently behind (R.
135: 143-44, 164-65). Irvin allegedly again asked how much further they had to go, to
which Carter responded: "Well, man, listen, if I had a violin, I'd play it for you. But look,
it is just up the street a little further more" (R. 135: 144). According to Carter, Irvin got
mad, said: "Oh, I know what you guys are going to d o . . . . I'm going to get you niggers,"
and then ran up to the comer, briefly entered the Circle K and then ran out of sight (R.
135: 144-45). Carter and defendant, surprised and apparently dumbfounded by Irvin's
behavior, then purchased a couple of quarts of Miller beer at the Circle K and thereafter
retraced their steps in search of Irvin to see if they could find out what was going on with
him, ultimately ending up at the bus station where they were soon accosted by the police
officers (R. 135: 145-47).
Carter denied taking any money from Irvin's pocket (R. 135: 148). He also
testified that defendant did not hear his conversation with Irvin, did not engage in any
kind of conversation with Irvin, and walked behind Irvin and him (R. 135: 149). Carter
said he never told defendant about his deal with Irvin before he was arrested (R. 135:
150). Carter also denied ever selling drugs prior to this incident (R. 135: 167).
Carter also acknowledged that his drug-supplying friend lived on Sixth North and
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Tenth West (R. 135: 179). Carter testified that he did not think that it was important to
inform Irvin that they would be walking for fifteen blocks, and first claimed that he never
had the chance to inform Irvin during their walk that their purported destination was so
distant from the Mall because Irvin immediately became disgusted and left (R. 135: 180).
Thereafter, in response to further questioning from the prosecutor, Carter testified that he
answered Irvin's concerns about the walk by saying, "It is not very much further" (R.
135: 182).
Defendant lives at 849 South 600 East (R. 135: 206). He testified that he went to
the Crossroads Mall in order to catch a bus that would take him to his girlfriend's
workplace, located at 15th South and West Temple (R. 135: 207). Thereafter, defendant
told substantially the same story as Carter (R. 135: 208-18). Specifically, he stated that .
while not "close" and not hearing their conversation, he witnessed Carter approach Irvin
and then Irvin pass some bills to Carter (R. 135: 209-10). He thought they were friends
(R. 135: 212-13). He then followed, "like hanging back," Carter and Irvin as they made
their way to Second West, thinking he was going to get a beer (R. 135:212-13, 228).
When Irvin later got mad, Carter said, "Don't even worry about it, you know" (R. 135:
214). He testified that he never bumped or touched Irvin or had any knowledge of what
had happened between Carter and Irvin (R. 135: 212, 216).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
On appeal, defendant primarily asserts that alleged testimony of newly discovered
witnesses was material to his defense. However, because defendant argued in support of
his motion for a continuance only that the witnesses' expected testimony would
collaterally impeach the victim's story, he failed to preserve his primary claim for appeal.
Additionally, the trial court properly recognized that not only did the alleged testimony
fail to impeach, but also that evidence merely for collateral impeachment is inadequate to
justify a continuance.
Defendant's claims also fail on the merits. Expected testimony of the witness
defense counsel actually spoke with was only that the witness claimed to have seen the
victim use methamphetamine as much as two years prior to this incident. Such
unsubstantiated claim of use of an unrelated drug, remote in time, was immaterial to
bolstering the theory of the defense, to wit: that the theft victim was actually involved in a
failed drug transaction. The other prospective witness was unnamed, unlocated when the
continuance was sought, and it was uncertain what such witness would say even if found.
Thus, defendant failed to show that this witness was available or that his hypothesized
testimony was other than speculative. Even if there was error in denying defendant's
motion to continue, it was harmless in view of the incredible testimony of defendant and
his cohort and the remoteness and lack of specificity of the proffered testimony..
8

ARGUMENT
POINT I
BY FAILING TO PRESENT TO THE TRIAL COURT THE
SPECIFIC GROUNDS IN SUPPORT OF HIS MOTION FOR A
CONTINUANCE ARGUED ON APPEAL, DEFENDANT FAILED
TO PRESERVE HIS CLAIM. IN ANY CASE, THE TRIAL COURT
DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR A CONTINUANCE BECAUSE HE FAILED TO
SHOW THAT THE SOUGHT-AFTER WITNESSES' TESTIMONY
WAS ADMISSIBLE OR MATERIAL TO ANY RELEVANT ISSUE
A. The Factual Background.
At the conclusion of the trial, on the morning after both sides had rested, but
before the jury was instructed, defendant moved to continue the trial (R. 39-40; 137: 24).1 In support of his motion, defendant argued that earlier that morning he learned that a
Brian Meek, another inmate at the jail, claimed to have known a Joshua Irvin when they
were in high school and that Meek claimed to have seen Irvin around methamphetamine
and seen Irvin use methamphetamine within the last two years, but not recently (R. 137:
2-3). Meek also allegedly stated that he had "friends" who knew Irvin better than he did,
one of whom Irvin owed money for drugs (R. 137: 3).
Defendant argued that this information "may be important to the case" to impeach
Irvin's testimony "that he doesn't use drugs" (R. 137: 3) (emphasis added). Defendant
further argued that Meek's unknown friend, to whom Irvin allegedly owed money, could

1

The transcript of defendant's motion for a continuance is attached at Addendum

A.
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impeach Irvin's testimony that he was being "sarcastic" when he stated that it was not his
usual practice to buy drugs from strangers, "//we were to find the person who he owes
money to for drugs and [the unknown witness] actually went to school together and were
friends" (R. 137: 3). Defendant asked for additional time to investigate these possibilities
more fully (R. 137: 3-4). The trial court summarily denied defendant's motion (R. 137:
4).
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court prejudicially abused its discretion
in denying his motion for a continuance to investigate the two above-mentioned witnesses
whose testimony allegedly would have established the probability that the incident was
not a theft, but instead a drug deal gone awry. App. Br. at 7-17, 26-31. However, in
making this argument, defendant first fails to acknowledge that the purported testimony
of both sought-after witnesses was offered only to collaterally impeach the victim, a
legally inadequate basis for granting a motion for a continuance, a proffer which failed to
preserve for appeal a challenge based on the alleged substantive value of the witnesses'
testimony. Even considering the argument on its merits, defendant overstates his claim
that Meek, the only witness actually located by defendant, could have effectively lent
substantive weight to the defense theory of the case. Additionally, the hypothesized
testimony of the other witness, an alleged drug dealer, neither named nor located, was not
likely admissible and necessarily so speculative as to be immaterial.

10

B. Defendant Failed to Preserve His Claim on Appeal.
An issue presented on appeal must first be preserved in the trial court:
"A general rule of appellate review in criminal cases in Utah is that a
contemporaneous objection or some form of specific preservation of
claims of error must be made a part of the trial court record before an
appellate court will review such claim on appeal." Importantly, the
grounds for the objection must be distinctly and specifically stated.
State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144-45 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted) (emphasis
added) (declining to review a general motion to dismiss an element of the offense
because the asserted grounds "were not specifically or distinctly stated to the court
below"). In the absence of plain error, a defendant cannot raise an unpreserved issue on
appeal. State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 859 (Utah 1992).
"To preserve a particular evidentiary objection for appeal, a defendant must
specifically state to the trial court the same grounds for objection presented on appeal."
State v. Brown, 853 P.2d at 859 (citing State v. Van Matre, 777 P.2d 459, 462 (Utah
1989)). Following this general rule, Utah appellate courts have consistently declined to
review claims on appeal concerning rulings that were challenged on different grounds in
the court below. In State v. McCardelL 652 P.2d 942, 947 (Utah 1982), for example,
the supreme court refused to consider the defendant's claim that "mug shots" were
improperly admitted, even though the claim had merit, because the objection at trial
was based on lack of foundation rather than prejudice, the grounds asserted on appeal.
In State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487, 495 (Utah App. 1992), afTd, 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah
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1993), a case analogous to this case, this Court declined to review the defendant's claims
of improper admission of character evidence under rule 404, Utah Rules of Evidence,
where evidence at trial was objected to on grounds of materiality, as well as other
unpreserved grounds. See also State v. Ramos, 882 P.2d 149, 155 n.3 (Utah App.
1994)(declining review based on alleged violation of right of confrontation where
objection at trial was that question was leading); State v. Peters, 796 P.2d 708, 712-13
(Utah App. 1990)(declining review of alleged inadmissible opinion evidence where
objection below was only that question was leading).2
"One of the primary reasons for imposing waiver rules like rule 103(a)(l)[, Utah
Rules of Evidence,] is to assure that the trial court has the first opportunity to address a
claim that it erred." State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 1991) (considering an
issue not raised at trial because the trial court, in a motion for a new trial, addressed the
issue fully and did not rely on waiver). See also State v. RangeU 866 P.2d 607, 612 (Utah
App. 1993)(failure to clearly and specifically object to facial constitutionality of rule of

2

In the analogous circumstance in which a defendant has challenged the
admissibility of state's evidence as improper impeachment, but argued different grounds
on appeal, there is abundant authority in support of the appellate court's declining review
of the unpreserved substantive issue. See Green v. State, 956 S.W.2d 849, 856 (Ark.
1997)(refusing to consider on appeal claim that misdemeanor conviction should not have
been allowed into evidence under rules of evidence where objection at trial was based on
claim that prior misdemeanor conviction for impeachment purposes was irrelevant); State
v. Prioleau, 664 A.2d 743, 762 (Conn. 1995)(refusing to consider challenge to rebuttal
alleging improper impeachment evidence where challenge at trial based solely relevancy);
State v. Gulov, 705 P.2d 1182, 1189 (Wash. 1985)(objection made as improper
impeachment insufficient to preserve for appeal challenge based on hearsay rule), cert,
denied, 475 U.S. 1020(1986).
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evidence "deprived the trial court of the required opportunity to consider the rule on that
issue").
In this case, defendant moved for a continuance only on the grounds that the
sought-after witnesses' testimony would impeach Irvin on his denial of his use and
purchase of drugs (R. 137: 3-4). There is nothing in defendant's argument to suggest to
the trial court that the purpose for seeking the continuance was to obtain substantive,
material evidence that would lend weight to the defense theory, to wit: because Irvin
might have been a drug user in the past he was now likely a drug user who was
purchasing drugs on this occasion. Therefore, because this issue was not presented to the
trial court for its consideration and plain error has not been argued on appeal, this Court
should decline to consider defendant's claim on its merits.
Additional grounds for refusing to consider defendant's claim of error on the
issues as he presents them on appeal is the trial court's recognition that defendant's
asserted reason for the continuance-collateral impeachment of the victim—was baseless.
First, impeachment evidence alone is insufficient to support a motion for a continuance.
State v. Creviston. 646 P.2d 750, 753 (Utah 1982)("It is not an abuse of discretion to deny
a motion for continuance when the testimony sought is only for collateral impeachment
purposes."); cf State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 794 (Utah 1991)(new trial based merely on
evidence of credibility not generally overturned on appeal); State v. Becker. 803 P.2d
1290, 1294 (Utah App. 1990)(new trial not warranted where new evidence only has
13

impeachment value).
Further, defendant failed to establish an adequate foundation for Meek's and the
other unknown witness's alleged impeachment testimony. See State v. Squire, 888 P.2d
1102, (Utah App. 1994)(noting that impeachment constitutes an attack on a defendant's
testimony when it is untruthful, misleading, or inaccurate). On cross-examination, defense
counsel asked Irvin if he used marijuana, and Irvin responded that he did not (R. 134: 25).
Also, when asked at the preliminary hearing if he had solicited the sale of marijuana from
Carter, Irvin had stated that it was not his "usual practice" to solicit from perfect strangers
(R. 134: 25). When asked on cross-examination at trial if he had a "usual practice" about
purchasing marijuana from strangers, Irvin denied such a custom, indicating that at the
preliminary hearing he had used that phrase somewhat sarcastically (R. 134: 25).
However, the proffered testimony of Meek is simply that he saw Irvin use
methamphetamine some time in the past two years but not recently, a statement which
fails to impeach Irvin's denying his use or purchase of marijuana. Similarly, the
proffered testimony of the unknown drug supplier, assertedly one of Meek's and Irvin's
friends, that Irvin owed money for drugs, fails to impeach Irvin's statements that he does
not use marijuana and does not customarily purchase marijuana from strangers.
Furthermore, such alleged specific instances of Irvin's prior methamphetamine use and
drug purchase would almost certainly be excluded under rule 608, Utah Rules of
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Evidence.3 See State v. Martinez, 848 P.2d 702, 704-05 (Utah App.) (testimony that
undercover police officer used drugs during the time she was working on case of
defendant charged with distributing drugs was properly excluded as extrinsic evidence of
specific instances of conduct), cert, denied. 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993). Therefore, the trial
court plainly did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a continuance
based on a proffer of possible impeachment evidence where defendant's proffered
evidence did not even contradict the victim's testimony. However, even considering
defendant's claim on the grounds asserted on appeal, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying the motion.
C. The Standard of Review — In Order to Prevail, Defendant Must
Show that the Trial Court Abused its Discretion, and that the Outcome
Would Have Been Different if a Continuance had been granted.
In State v. Oliver, 820 P.2d 474 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied. 843 P.2d 516 (Utah
1992), this Court restated the necessary showing in support of a motion for a continuance
and the standard of review in the grant or denial of such a motion:
The grant or denial of a continuance is within the discretion of the
trial court. State v. Humphervs. 707 P.2d 109, 109 (Utah 1985) (per
curiam); State v. Creviston. 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982); State v.
Moosman. 542 P.2d 1093, 1094 (Utah 1975).* This court will not reverse the
trial court's decision absent a clear abuse of discretion. Id.

3

Rule 608(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, provides in pertinent part:

Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of
attacking or supporting the witness1 credibility, other than conviction of
crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence.
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When moving for a continuance, a party must show that denial of the
motion will prevent the party from obtaining material and admissible
evidence, that any additional witnesses it seeks can be produced within a
reasonable time, and that it has exercised due diligence in preparing for the
case before requesting the continuance. State v. Linden, 761 P.2d 1386,
1387 (Utah 1988).4 Absent such showing, the trial court does not abuse its
discretion if it denies the motion. IcL We are also persuaded by Washington
precedent, that on appeal, the moving party must show that it was materially
prejudiced by the court's denial of the continuance or that the trial result
would have been different had the continuance been granted. State v.
Barker, 667 P.2d 108, 114 (Wash. App. 1983).
Id at 476.
D. Defendant Failed to Show the Trial Court that
Meek's Testimony was Material to the Issue of Guilt
As a preliminary matter, it is unclear whether defendant's motion for a continuance
was supported by an adequate foundation and was, therefore, too speculative. Cf.
Moosman, 542 P.2d at 1095 (recognizing that lack of precision in evaluation of polygraph
results did not warrant continuing trial for six weeks in expectation of finding expert who
would testify as to the defendant's favorable results).
Defendant asserts that Meek would have testified that he had seen Irvin use
methamphetamine, sometime, though not recently within the past two years (R. 134: 2-3).
First, Meek claimed that he went to Cyprus High School with a person named Joshua Irvin
who had long blond hair and was 5f9" or 5'10" (R. 137: 2-3). Carter testified that Irvin

4

In fact, Linden, notes that the moving party must show that the sought-after
witness "could actually be produced within a reasonable time. Id. at 1387 (quoting
Creviston. 646 P.2d at 752)(emphasis added).
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had long hair, and Irvin testified he currently resides in West Valley City (R. 134: 1; R:
135: 141).5 However, Irvin also testified that he grew up in Kearns (R. 134: 51). There is
no evidence confirming Irvin's height, and defense counsel was unable to positively
confirm Meek's alleged acquaintance with Irvin. Thus, the trial court might reasonably
have felt less than certain that Meek was actually referring to the same individual.
Similarly, the trial court would reasonably have been concerned with the
definitiveness of Meek's proffered testimony in the absence of a supporting affidavit.
Rule 12, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, does not require that an affidavit accompany a
motion. Utah R. Evid 12(a)("[A motion] may be supported by affidavit or by evidence.").
Nonetheless, u [a] trial court must be able to pass upon the materiality of the testimony
before granting a continuance/9 Creviston. 646 P.2d at 752. "Where the content of the
prospective witness1 testimony is speculative or likely to be inadmissible, it is not an abuse
of discretion to deny a continuance." IdL (motion for continuance denied where the
defendant's attorney's affidavit stated that affiant did not know just what sought-after
witness would say although attorney believed it would be favorable to the defendant).6 In
5

The State does not dispute that there is a Cyprus High School is located in West
Valley City.
6

Utah appellate cases discussing the propriety of rulings on motions for a
continuance typically display the appellate court's coordinate concern for not only the
sufficiency of the defendant's averments, but also their authenticity, whether by affidavit
or some other palpable means. See Linden, 761 P.2d at 1387 (record in support of motion
for continuance barren where, among other deficiencies, the defendant prepared no
affidavit to show attempt to contact witnesses); Creviston, 646 P.2d at 752-53 (affidavit
of attorney and sought-after witness inadequate to support motion); State v. Horton, 848
P.2d 708, 714-15 (Utah App.)(motion properly denied where absent witness's testimony
17

this case, defense counsel simply proffered what Meek told him (R. 137: 2-3). No
assurance was given to the trial court about what Meek would actually testify to.
Overshadowing these preliminary uncertainties, however, is the immateriality of
Meek's alleged testimony. Defendant argues that Meek's claimed observation of Irvin
using methamphetamine sometime within the two-year period preceding the current
incident constitutes material evidence that Irvin was not the victim of a theft, but rather
solicited a failed drug sale from Carter. App. Br. at 7, 9, 13, 15.7 Applying relevant case
law, the claim is utterly without merit.
In State v. Humpherys. 707 P.2d 109 (Utah 1985) (per curiam), the supreme court
found speculative the testimony of a potential witness who allegedly could provide
mitigating evidence by referring to a case that had nothing to do with the charges before
the court, and thereby upheld the trial court's denial of the motion for a continuance. IdL at
109. See also Strong v. State, 109 S.W. 536 (Ark. 1908) (motion for a continuance for an

was available from deposition), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). The same
consideration pertains in the somewhat analogous context of a motion for a new trial. See
James, 819 P.2d at 794 n.41 (noting that a new trial is justified where newly discovered
testimony on a vital point appears from affidavits in support of the motion to be reliable
and would change the result).
7

Defendant's exorbitant claims on appeal for the effect of Meek's alleged
testimony, which plainly go beyond their proffered content and only grow as defendant
proceeds with his argument, also betray their speculativeness. Defendant claims that (1)
Irvin's "inclination to use drugs in general [evidenced] the likelihood that he sought
marijuana on this occasion" (App. Br. at 9 ) ; (2) "Meek's statements would further
establish that Irvin was inclined to purchase drugs and, therefore, was a party to the drug
deal" (App. Br. at 9); (3) "Meek's statements substantiate [defendant's] defense theory,
namely the existence of a drug deal between Irvin and Carter" (App. Br. at 13);
"Meek's statements . . . provide unbiased evidence of a drug deal" (App. Br. at 13).
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absent witness, whose testimony would be as to a fight between the defendant and the
deceased several months before their fatal encounter, was too remote to throw any light on
defendant's conduct at the time of the killing, and failed to connect the encounters,
properly denied); Marshall v. State. 621 N.E.2d 308, 319 (Ind. 1993)(motion to continue
properly denied where detective, an absent witness, could not provide personal
observations concerning relevant and material evidence).8
Moreover, because the victim not only denied that the incident was really a drug
transaction, but also any use or purchase of marijuana generally, an effort by the defense
to introduce evidence of an unsubstantiated use of an unrelated drug, remote in time, for
the purpose of showing current drug use would have been denied. See State v. DeAlo, 748

8

Recognizing that a motion for a new trial based on a newly discovered witness
poses essentially the same issues as a motion for a continuance, see e.g., James, 819 P.2d
at 793 (setting out a similar set of evaluative criteria, to wit: reasonable diligence would
not have uncovered evidence, evidence not cumulative, and evidence would render a
different result probable), defendant relies on cases involving denial of motions for new
trial which were reversed on appeal. App. Br. at 10-14. Those cases, however, are
clearly distinguishable from this case. See James, 819 P.2d at 793-95 (newly discovered
witness refuted the prosecution's principal witness attesting to the defendant's confession
and went "to the heart of the evidence against [the] defendant"); State v. Walker, 743 P.2d
191, 194-95 (Utah 1987)(in prosecution for child sex abuse in which victims, ages six and
ten at time of trial, new witness would have authoritatively testified that victims' mother
had deliberately "educated" her daughters concerning sex by having them watch their
mother engage in sexual intercourse and other sexual activities with her boyfriend, thus
explaining the victims' "extraordinarily confused and contradictory testimony" and
opening the possibility that the defendant told the truth about his actions); Jensen v.
Logan Citv, 89 Utah 347, 379-80, 57 P.2d 708, 723 (1936)(in action against municipality
for damages from injuries caused by fence wire allegedly projecting onto pavement,
unheard witnesses would have given testimony on the changing position of the wire prior
to the accident). In the only case relevant to this discussion, the Court upheld the denial
of the new trial motion, finding that the defendant failed to show how new evidence of a
settlement agreement was exculpatory and that the evidence was offered only for
impeachment. State v. Becker. 803 P.2d 1290, 1993-94 (Utah App. 1990).
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P.2d 194, 199 (Utah App. 1987)(the defendant's handwritten "dope ledger," which
recorded cocaine transactions in California, had questionable probative value because it
neither recorded information that bore a relation to the cocaine seized in Utah nor
demonstrated any conspiracy related to the Utah cocaine seizure). Cf State v. Featherson,
781 P.2d 424, 427-31 (Utah 1989)(finding in aggravated sexual assault conviction, that the
defendant's ogling two women, one of whose skirts he lifted earlier on the day of the
offense, was not probative of the defendant's state of mind seven or eight hours later, that
the prosecution's cross-examining the defendant on the same defense he asserted in three
prior sex offense convictions was error because their was no relationship to the current
charge, and the admission of two uncharged sex offenses occurring nine years prior to the
charged incident was error because immaterial to the defendant's modus operandi and too
remote in time).
In sum, because defendant failed to show that Meek's statements were material to
defendant's theory of defense, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
defendant's motion for a continuance.

E. Defendant Failed to Show that the Unnamed, Unlocated Witness
Was Available to Give Admissible Evidence or Could Offer
Anything Other than Purely Speculative Testimony,
According to defense counsel, Meek claimed to have a friend to whom Irvin owed
money for drugs (R. 137: 3). On such hearsay, defendant confidently identifies this
20

unknown, unlocated witness as Irvin's "supplier." App. Br. at 10. Defendant then claims
that further investigation of this individual would reveal his identity, his relationship to the
victim, the likelihood of the victim's obtaining drugs from strangers, and evidence
bolstering the defense theory that the victim would buy drugs from anyone doing business.
App. Br. at 9-10. Defendant further argues that his failure to name or locate the alleged
witness was not important in assessing his availability because the very purpose of the
continuance was to determine the witness's identity and availability. App. Br. at 19-20.
Defendant's arguments fail on several counts.
First, contrary to his understanding, defendant must show that the sought-after
witness "could actually be produced, [and] that the witness could be produced within a
reasonable time." Linden. 761 P.2d at 1387 (quoting Creviston. 646 P.2d at 752). In
acknowledging that the availability of the witness was "underterminable," defendant has
patently failed to make one of the required showings in support of a motion for a
continuance. See State v. Barnes. 409 A.2d 988, 991 (R.I. 1979)(rejecting claim that
continuance was justified in order to locate missing witness and determine if he was
available to testify and would testify for the defense). Further, it is highly improbable that
a drug supplier would make himself available for trial or, in any case, would offer any
useful testimony in support of defendant's defense.
Second, notwithstanding his assurances on appeal, defendant failed to show the trial
court that the unnamed witness could testify to any material facts. See State v. Williams.
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712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985)(upholding denial of motion for continuance where defense
counsel "was only able to offer that she '[had] no idea what [the witness's] testimony
would be"). In fact, defense counsel at trial signaled the trial court how uncertain his
understanding of the witness's testimony was in stating that this "new information . . . may
be important to the case . . . if we were to find the person who [Irvin] owes money to and
he actually went to school together" (R. 137: 3). Such a tenuous assertion of a witness's
value is inadequate to support a motion for a continuance. See Humphreys, 707 P.2d at
109-10 (motion properly denied as "speculative, at best," where defendant asserted that
sought-after witness "might" volunteer some helpful information and whose claimed
mitigating evidence was irrelevant to the charges currently before the court). In sum,
because defendant failed to show to the trial court that the unnamed, unlocated witness
was either available or could offer material evidence, the court did not abuse its discretion
in denying defendant's motion.
F. Defendant Fails to Show Prejudice as a Result of the Denial of his Motion.
Even assuming, arguendo, the trial court did abuse its discretion in denying
defendant's motion for a continuance, defendant was not prejudiced. Stated differently,
even if Meek's statements had been admitted, defendant would still have been convicted.
See State v. Alonzo. 932 P.2d 606, 613 (Utah App. 1997)(";For an error to require
reversal, the likelihood of a different outcome must be sufficiently high to undermine
confidence in the outcome."')(quoting State v. Knight. 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987)),
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cert, granted. 940 P.2d 1224 (Utah 1997).
Defendant's arguments in support of his claim of prejudice are as fanciful as those
in support of the materiality of his sought-after witnesses' statements. Thus, defendant
claims that (1) denial of Meek's statements deprived him of the opportunity to show
"Irvin's drug use and purchasing habit" (App. Br. at 26); (2) defendant was hampered by
the prosecution witnesses' "reluctance and adversity" in answering questions, "likely"
suggesting to the jury that the defense was manipulating them (App. Br. at 26);
(3) because the police are regarded as authority figures, police officers' testimony that
they "arrested"defendant and Carter may have been especially weighty in suggesting
defendant's guilt, especially since the trial court gave only one instruction on the
credibility of witnesses in general (App. Br. at 27 and 27 n.6); (4) defendant was hampered
by Carter's damaging testimony about leading the victim on too long a walk for a minor
drug deal, suggesting Carter, and defendant by implication, were thieves in any case, when
defendant was merely "tagging along" (App. Br. at 27); (5) lack of a continuance
prevented defendant from presenting his own defense, to wit: Meek's statements would
have shown the victim was inclined to use drugs and had a history of buying drugs and,
therefore, the victim was engaged in a drug deal on this occasion (App. Br. at 27-28); and
(6) lack of a continuance deprived defendant of the opportunity to show that it was Carter
and not he who was involved in a drug deal gone sour (App. Br. at 28).
Defendant's claims fail to establish prejudice. Answering defendant in serial
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fashion, (1) Meek's statements, even if true, go only to an isolated, remote instance
concerning an unrelated substance, all of which hardly establish a "habit" guiding Irvin's
conduct on this occasion. (2) Meek's testimony would not have prevented the prosecution
witnesses from responding as they did, and defendant's suggestion that vigorous crossexamination by the defense is likely to prejudice the jury against a defendant is absurd.
(3) Police officers testifying that, upon Irvin's story and positive identification of Carter
and defendant as the thieves, they "arrested" the two men is nothing more than the
recounting of the fact of arrest. During voir dire, the court made it clear to the panel that it
would be an inappropriate expression of bias if any member tended to give the testimony
of a police officer more weight because of their position (R. 136: 13). Contrary to
defendant's assertion, no less than six instructions relevant to how the jury was to consider
the evidence in determining guilt or innocence were given, part of whose import was that
no class of testimony was inherently more weighty than another.9 See State v. Potter, 627

9

The jury was instructed that: the State bore the burden of proving the essential
allegations of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt (Jury Instruction 3, R. 43); mere
charging of the offense was not even a circumstance which should be considered in
determining guilt or innocence (Jury Instruction 4, R. 43); the jury might not consider the
fact of arrest against defendant and was to weigh and be guided by the evidence as
instructed (Jury Instruction 5, R. 44); there were no definite rules for determining the
weight and convincing force of any evidence, but that the jury should carefully and
conscientiously consider and compare all the testimony and that it was not bound to
believe any class of witnesses unless such testimony was reasonable and convincing (Jury
Instruction 8, R. 47); in judging the weight of the testimony and credibility of the
witnesses, the jury had the right to take into account the witness's bias and interest in the
outcome of the case (Jury Instruction 9, R. 48); and defendant's were competent
witnesses whose testimony should be received and given the same consideration as that of
any other witness (Jury Instruction 10, R. 49).
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P.2d 75, 81 (Utah 1981) (Hall, J., dissenting)("It is presumed that the jury read and
followed all of the court's instructions.")(ritations omitted). (4) If Carter's drug sale
defense was damaging, it was also the basis of defendant's claim innocence and the
rationale for seeking the very evidence urged in defendant's motion for a
continuance-defendant cannot have it both ways. (5) and (6) Meek's statements, as
discussed above, were insufficient to ground a defense based on the existence of a drug
sale.
In truth, the "drug sale" defense had terrible weaknesses and was evidently rejected
by the jury. First, it is not credible that after meeting defendant, with whom he was
allegedly good friends and had not seen in some time, Carter then disregarded his old
friend for a $13 drug sale. It is not credible that Carter was truly intending a drug
transaction for $13 by leading Irvin and a fifteen block walk (R. 135: 179-80). It is not
credible that defendant merely "tagged along" without any inquiry after having accepted
and invitation to have some beer. Indeed, defendant acknowledged having previously lied
to a police officer in connection with another offense (R. 135: 224-25). Finally, if Irvin
was truly an habitual drug user, as defendant urges, it is not credible that he would have
sought to engage with the police to retrieve a mere $13. In sum, it is not probable that the
admission of irrelevant, remote testimony as that sought by defendant would have resulted
in a different outcome.
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was truly an habitual drug user, as defendant urges, it is not credible that he would have
sought to engage with the police to retrieve a mere $13. In sum, it is not probable that the
admission of irrelevant, remote testimony as that sought by defendant would have resulted
in a different outcome.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully requests that defendant's
conviction be affirmed.
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED
Because this case presents no complex or novel questions, the State does not
request that it be set for oral argument or that a published opinion issue.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this M

day of June, 1998.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

KENNETH A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General
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1

PROCEEDINGS

2
THE COURT: Miss Clark, you wanted the
3 convenience of the record?
4
MS. CLARK: Thank you, Your Honor, This
5 morning at approximately J 0:301 received a note from
6 Mr. Ellis indicating that a person by the name of
7 Brian Meek, who is an inmate at the jail - he was
8 housed in l-B-3 at thj time this information was
9 brought up and now is in Soction 7-B - is - was
10 arrested for no insurance, no registration and no
H seal belt He ovoheard some other people in the
12 jail speaking about the victim in this case, or the
13 alleged victim in this case, Joshua Irvin, Mr. Meeks
u spoke up and said be knew Mr. Irvin and that he had
15 seen him in the past being around crystal
16 methamphetamine and also using crystal
17 methamphetamine.
18
I received that information, I notified
19 the Court, the Court instructed that 1 go speak to
20 Mr. Meek. I took my investigator, Patty - 1 forgot
21 - Rodman is her last name, and we both went and
22 spoke with Mr. Meek, He indicated to mo that he went
23 to a school with someone by the name of Joshua Irvin
24 at Cyprus High School He described the person as
25 being tall I asked him to describe that a little
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J bit more furtlier. He said that person was between
2 five foot, nine and five foot, ten with long blonde
3 'hair. He said he lived in the Magna or West Valley
4 Area. He indicated thai he - the person does
5 crystal methamphetamine. 1 pressed him on that He
6 said that he had actually soon Mm around it, saw htm
7 do it but it has been within the last two years. He
B hasn't seen him recently. But he knows friends of
9 his who knows Mr, Irvin much better than Mr. Meek
10 known htm. Additionally, he indicates that one of
11 his friends is owed money for Mr. Irvin for drugs.
12
And at this time we would be asking the
13 Court to continue Oris. Although we have rested,
14 this is new information that may bo important to the
15 case; the reason being is Mr, Irvin indicated that be
16 doesn't use drugs in his testimony, He also
17 indicated that ~ there was a statement at the
18 preliminary hearing where he - his usual practice is
19 not to buy drugs from strangers, which if wo were to
20 find the person who he owes moocy to for drugs and he
21 actually went to Kchool together and were friends
22 together, that would impeach that statement that 23 he didn't say that he meant that for face value, that
24 he meant it sarcastically. And we'd be asking the
25 Court to give us some time to investigate this
Page 4
better. And, you know, with this just short notice,
we haven't done anything, but 1 did speak to this
Mr. Meek
THE COURT: Mr. Reestone?
MR. FREESTONE: I donft have anything to
add, Your Honor.
THE COURT: 7be requost for continuance
is denied.
(End supplemental.)
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